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I thought I would begin with the observation that this conference is called 
The International Criminal Court and the Community of Nations, and so each 
of our conversations today has been structured around a different “commu-
nity.” When it comes to non-party states, however, I am hard pressed to con-
ceptualize them as forming a community per se. One would expect members 
of a community to share certain attributes, including at least some sort of 
shared values or understandings. Nonetheless, as we heard from Diane Amann 
this morning, there is a refrain that we hear from many of the non-party states. 
It is a refrain of emphasis on sovereignty, and a distinction between the sov-
ereigntist values of these non-party states and the idea of “global governance” 
embodied by international institutions and by the International Criminal Court 
(ICC)—or so the dichotomy is presented.1 To the extent there is a community 
at work, perhaps the glue among these disparate states is at least a rhetorical 
emphasis on sovereignty and a tacit or even explicit assumption that sover-
eignty is inherently in tension with the treaty mechanisms that were created in 
Rome in 1998. In my remarks, I will talk about the who of this community, 
the what of their complaints about the ICC, and the why that animates these 
complaints. 
It is fairly straightforward to identify the who. As you all know, at the 
Rome Conference in 1998, 120 states voted to adopt the treaty.2 Seven states 
voted against the treaty, and although it was an anonymous vote, those states 
have subsequently been identified as China, Iraq, Israel, Qatar, Sri Lanka, Su-
dan, and the United States.3 The main objection articulated by the United 
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States at the time, as you will recall, was a fairly narrow and specific objec-
tion: namely, that the treaty structure adopted by these 120 states contains 
jurisdictional provisions that enable the ICC to exercise jurisdiction over in-
dividuals who are nationals of states that have yet to ratify the Rome Statute.4 
Contrary to misrepresentations in popular media, and even statements by 
some current U.S. officials, the ICC does not purport to exercise an unlimited 
universal jurisdiction.5 However, if crimes that fall within the subject matter 
jurisdiction and the temporal jurisdiction of the court are alleged to have been 
committed on the territory of a state party to the Rome Statute, then individu-
als implicated in those crimes, who may be nationals of non-party states, also 
fall within the enumerated categories of jurisdiction under the statute.6 This 
possibility has always been the consistent objection of the United States to the 
structure of the Rome Statute and to the purported jurisdictional reach of the 
court that it created.7 In addition, if a situation is referred to the ICC by the 
UN Security Council, the fact that a state whose nationals are implicated by 
the referral has not ratified the Rome Statute will not be a barrier to the ICC 
exercising its jurisdiction under the terms of the Rome Statute.8 
Notwithstanding this objection, as you all know, the administration of 
President Bill Clinton affixed the signature of the United States to the Rome 
Statute at the very last opportunity.9 Although the United States is not a party 
to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), Article 18 of that 
convention indicates that a signatory to a treaty—not necessarily a party, but 
a signatory—is obliged not to take any steps to undermine the object and pur-
pose of that treaty.10 If you are a party to the VCLT, or if you think that Article 
18 has some customary international law valence, then you might be con-
cerned about the status of the United States as a signatory. This is not a posi-
tion the Bush administration, which followed the Clinton administration, was 
satisfied with, to say the least.11 In 2001, Senator Jesse Helms gave a speech 
at the American Enterprise Institute that I quoted in a 2001 article about the 
ICC and article 98(2).12 Just to give you a flavor—this is back in the very 
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beginning, before the court even existed, before the statute had been ratified 
by the required 60 states—Jesse Helms said:  
 
[f]irst, the Bush Administration should simply un-sign the 
Rome Statute. I mean, quite literally, that the Administration 
should instruct someone at the U.S. Mission in New York to 
walk across the street to the UN, ask to see the treaty docu-
ment, and then take out a pen and draw a line through Ambas-
sador Scheffer’s name. I think that will send a clear message.13 
 
Well, as all of you know, the United States is reported to have “un-signed” 
the treaty. In concrete terms, the United States purported to do this by sending 
a letter, indicating the United States did not intend to ratify the statute and 
therefore did not consider itself to be bound by any obligation under Article 
18 to act consistent with, or not to undermine, the statute.14 As you may also 
recall, that letter, which was sent in 2002, was perhaps somewhat unusually 
signed not by the Ambassador to the United Nations, but by the Under Secre-
tary of State for Arms Control and International Security, coincidentally a 
gentleman by the name of John Bolton.15 
Since that 2002 letter from the United States, a number of other signatories 
to the Rome Statute have also deposited letters indicating they do not intend 
to become parties and therefore do not consider themselves bound in any way 
by their signatures.16 These signatories include Israel in 2002,17 Sudan in 
2008,18 and Russia in 2016.19 There are other states that have indicated that 
they intend to, or have in fact, deposited instruments withdrawing from the 
Rome Statute or purporting to do so.20 Burundi and the Philippines, as we 
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heard this morning, have done that, as have South Africa and Gambia—alt-
hough these latter two states subsequently deposited a further notification 
withdrawing their withdrawal.21 That is where we stand with respect to the 
community of non-party states, along with the states that never signed or rat-
ified the Rome Statute to begin with. That is the who. 
I already talked a little bit about the what. The United States’ main com-
plaint is the purported exercise of jurisdiction over nationals of non-party 
states under the terms of the statute.22 Earlier today, we heard a video message 
from the ICC prosecutor. I found it interesting that in the catalog of situations 
that are either being investigated, or that the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) 
has made the subject of a preliminary examination, the vast majority of the 
non-African situations involve acts by nationals of non-party states. There are 
seven such examinations or investigations, two of which have been concluded 
by the OTP without a decision to move forward with further action.23 These 
are cataloged in a paper by Yaël Ronen from Hebrew University entitled The 
ICC and Nationals of Non-Party States.24 It is interesting to note that this un-
derstandable desire to be more geographically inclusive in the work of the 
OTP seems to entail—and I would suggest not inevitably—a focus on situa-
tions where the question of asserting jurisdiction over nationals of non-party 
states has become an issue that is front and center. This may exacerbate the 
backlash in rhetoric and actions that we have seen in certain countries. 
I will move on to my last question, the why. Why is this objectionable? 
Why do countries object to the exercise of jurisdiction by an international 
court over their nationals when most of these countries would accept that, by 
virtue of the territorial principle of jurisdiction, the states on whose territory 
the conduct occurred would be able to assert criminal jurisdiction themselves, 
absent some sort of status or forces agreement or other consensual arrange-
ment? I think the purest expression of the ideological opposition to the court 
came recently in a September 2018 speech by John Bolton, now National Se-
curity Advisor to the President, in remarks to the Federalist Society, and in a 
speech by President Trump to the General Assembly of the United Nations.25 
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The overarching ideological opposition articulated in those two public state-
ments was between what the President referred to as an “ideology of patriot-
ism” and what he characterized as an “ideology of globalism.”26 This vocab-
ulary has been attributed to one of the President’s advisors and speech writers, 
Stephen Miller,27 and the language also echoes the rhetoric in a 1990 article 
written by John Bolton and published in the Chicago Journal of International 
Law entitled “Should We Take Global Governance Seriously?”.28 Now I think 
if we take a step back, one answer to the challenge posed by this ideology of 
patriotism is that, as you all know, the ICC exercises complementary jurisdic-
tion to that of nation-states, rather than the primary jurisdiction assigned to 
the ad hoc international criminal tribunals.29 However, in a December 2017 
statement to the Assembly of States Parties, the U.S. representative indicated 
this was also objectionable, because the ICC itself determines whether or not 
a nation-state has in fact conducted the requisite investigation and, if neces-
sary, prosecution needed to prevent a case from going forward in the ICC.30 
The U.S. representative also indicated the United States rejects the ICC’s au-
thority to review the adequacy of domestic accountability mechanisms of a 
non-party state absent the consent of that state or Security Council authoriza-
tion.31 
I would like to end my remarks on perhaps a slightly more positive note. 
The group of non-party states cannot all be tarred with the same brush. Not-
withstanding the fairly alarmist, and one might even say incendiary, rhetoric 
of late, the United States has consistently articulated support for accountabil-
ity alongside objections to specific accountability mechanisms. For example, 
if you look at the December 2017 statement that the United States made at the 
Assembly of States Parties,32 or the way the OTP is proceeding in the Afghan-
istan situation from the broader pursuit of accountability for international 
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crimes,33 you can see a very conscious effort to separate jurisdictional objec-
tions to the ICC. Now I do think, given the current posture of the United 
States,  the profession of support for an emphasis on accountability does ring 
a bit hollow, especially because we have come to associate the ICC with the 
international justice project more generally. There is a tendency to perceive 
opposition to one as opposition to both, and support for one as support for 
both. But I do think it is important to distinguish between them. 
The footnote that I will add to my remarks is an interesting statement that 
the State Department Deputy Spokesperson issued on March 5, 2019, support-
ing Germany’s request that Lebanon extradite a Syrian general accused of 
crimes against humanity.34 The State Department indicated that the United 
States “would welcome any decision by the government of Lebanon that 
would facilitate the lawful extradition of Syrian General Jamil Hassan to Ger-
many.”35 Hassan faces charges in Germany for crimes against humanity for 
the extensive use of torture in Syrian detention centers, and he has already 
been the subject of sanctions by both the United States and the European Un-
ion. 
In conclusion, in my 2001 article I suggested that in developing the rules 
of procedure and evidence for the ICC, the Assembly of States Parties should 
not attempt to seek consensus at the expense of consistency with uniform val-
ues, applied uniformly.36 With a bit of hindsight, and given today’s political 
situation, it might well be worth focusing on areas where we can develop con-
sensus—even perhaps at the expense of a certain degree of consistency—so 
that we can move accountability efforts forward in the best way possible.  
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